In this paper, we present a methodology for capital adequacy. Capital adequacy in a bank could be viewed as an asset allocation problem. Therefore it is possible to use the framework of the portfolio theory. But it requires to estimate the correlation matrix of the business line returns. In this work, we estimate this correlation matrix by using a factor model based on external data. In a second part of this article, we provide some illustrations to rebalance optimally the capital allocation within the bank.
This paper is based on two works made at the Operational Research Group of Crédit Lyonnais ( [7] , [15] ). The ndings being condential, this paper is not extensively illustrated by gures. Moreover, we have decided to conceal any reference to particular nancial institutions. Yet, the main lines have been preserved.
A market factor model
Let's consider a bank organized into M business lines. Let f (m) t be the return of the business line m and α (m) t be the proportion of capital allocated to this business line at the period t. The bank's return r t is assumed to be equal to
which means that the total return of the bank amounts to the sum of the business lines' returns. We can impose that f (m) t does not depend on the bank so that f (m) t is assimilated to a factor, and the asset class factor model (Sharpe [1992] ) is
This model is quite classical and it can be traced back to the Asset Pricing Theory from Ross [1976] . In the equation (2), u t is the non-factor component of the return. One of the main problem lies in determining the values of the unknown factors f
. Nevertheless, in a context of gaussian asset allocation, the problem can be solved if the the factors' rst and the second moments are known.
Using this model, we can estimate the correlations between the dierent business lines' returns. Then, this external correlation matrix can be used in an internal model based on top-down methodology. Let's point out that such a model is not perfect: an internal correlation matrix would be more relevant but, most of the time, a bank lacks internal data to estimate it acurrately. The approach above gets rid of this problem.
Assumptions and statistical properties of the model
Let's consider a panel of N banks. Let r t,n be the observed market return of the bank n at the period t. Let α t,n = α (m) t,n denote its sensitivity vector at the same period
The statistical model can be written as r t,n = α t,n f t + u t,n (4) where
is the random vector of the business lines' returns and u t,n an indiosyncratic term which captures all the specicities of the bank n. Since f t does not depend on the bank, α t,n f t can be viewed as the market composant of the stock return. The residual u t,n takes into account the fact that two banks with similar capital allocations does not necessarily have the same stock returns. As a consequence, we naturally suppose that the u t,n are statistically uncorrelated between two banks and also serially uncorrelated. Moreover, we suppose that f t and u t are independant and we assume that f t ∼ N (µ, Σ) and u t,n ∼ N 0, σ 2 n . Then, we have E [r t,n ] = α t,n µ
var [r t,n ] = α t,n Σα t,n + σ
It becomes apparent that the variance of the bank's return is the sum of two components. The rst component is a factor risk common to every bank. Two banks with the same capital allocation have the same factor risk. Let's notice that this factor risk is a lower risk bound (var [r t,n ] ≥ α t,n Σα t,n ). The second component is a specic risk that can be viewed as an eciency measure of the management of the bank.
The estimation method
With a panel of N banks, the matrix form of the relationship (4) is
where r t = (r t,n ) is the N × 1 vector of returns, A t = α t,n the M × N matrix of sensitivities and u t = (u t,n ) the N × 1 vector of residuals. Let D denote the covariance matrix of u t . To simplify the problem, we suppose that there is no correlation between the specic components of two dierent banks. Then, we have
The log-likelihood function of the model (7) is easy to derive in a gaussian framework but it still provides unbiased estimates under alternative statistical assumptions (see Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon [1984] ). This property is useful since returns can hardly be considered as gaussian. Given T dates of observation, the pseudo log-likelihood function is
Let θ = (µ, Σ, D) be the parameter vector. The maximum likelihood estimate is dened as the solution of the following optimisation problemθ
This problem could be solved numerically using a quasi-Newton algorithm like BFGS.
Remark 1 If we assume that the matrix A t is time-independant, then the score vector of the concentrated log-likelihood is 
Remark 3 Since the number of parameters is very high (dim
), starting values are very important for the optimisation convergence. We note that we could easily compute them using the OLS (or GLS) estimates of the model (7).
Data description
In order to perform the estimates, we rst have to specify the data we need to dene the model inputs:
1. The annual report may be used to dene the returns r t,n . Yet, in this case, the number of observations is not large enough to obtain consistency in ML estimation. So we have taken the daily stock returns from january 1994 to july 1999.
As for the factors f (m) t
, we decompose the banking activity into 8 typical business lines: retail banking, middle-market, asset mangement, corporate banking, structured nance, corporate market, life insurance and non-life insurance. The model can be applied to our whole panel or separetely, to dierent geographic areas. In this work, we have dened a European area and an American one. Then, we obtain 16 dierent factors.
3. The main issue lies in determining the dierent banks' sensitivities. We may assume that they are related to the current capital allocations. In this respect, each bank's capital allocation was conveniently treated to obtain a consistent (but probably approximated) measure of the economic capital dedicated to each business line. This hard task was performed by our Crédit Lyonnais expert, J-Y. Rossignol. 1.00
After estimating the worldwide correlation matrix, we performed its principal component analysis, which leads to the following results. With the rst seven components, we obtain a cumulative quality of about 95%. The rst component reects a worldwide trend factor (we may notice that almost all the business lines are represented in a same proportion). The second component is a geographic component: we clearly observe an opposition between European and American business lines. Nonetheless, three business lines do not take part in the elaboration of this axis (European BL #1 and American BL #2 and BL #3). The third component shows a link between the three European activites BL #1, BL #2 and BL #4. The fourth component is an american axis and concerns the activites BL #2, BL #3, BL #4 and BL #5. The remaining components oppose specic European activities to other specic American activities. Moreover, the model presented here is interesting because the equation (6) gives the decomposition of the risk of a bank between a factor-market risk and a specic risk. We can evaluate the proportion κ n of the risk explained by the factor-market risk. With the ML estimate, κ n takes the following value
Thus, it is possible to classify the nancial institutions according to κ n . The graphic (1) represents the histogram of κ n . We observe that in general, European banks have a smaller κ than American banks. That probably indicates that stock returns contains more information in American markets than in European ones.
Until now, we only considered the correlation matrix between the dierent business lines' returns. Let's point out that the model also permits to estimate the expected returns and risks. In an internal approach of capital allocation, these informations does not seem very useful. Internal expected returns and risks of every business line would be more relevant. Nethertheless, the estimates based on our panel stress out European and American specic behaviours. In the gure (2), we performed a mean-variance analysis. European business lines are generally less risky that American ones, but in the same time have smaller expected returns. We computed the ecient portfolios that are given by the traditional mean-variance optimisation program 1 (Markowitz [1987] 
The solution of the program (14) is the ecient frontier (every combination of portfolios belonging to this frontier remains ecient). We clearly note that the European frontier is on the left of the American one, If we go back to the main point at issue, we now dispose of an estimated correlation matrix which allows to implement a top-down approach of the internal capital allocation, 3 The capital allocation problem
In this section, we try to dene the capital allocation problem. In a rst paragraph, we introduce the concept of internal model and the interest of such a tool. In a second paragraph, we show that a capital allocation problem is not as simple as portfolio management. Finally, we provide an example using the correlation matrix we estimated.
Building an internal model
We consider an objective function that has to be maximized. In corporate nance, this function is the rm value, more precisely the shareholder's wealth. The Shareholder Value Added analysis (SVA) consists in dening the rules permitting to reach this objective. One problem is to dene exactly the shareholder's wealth and its measure. We could for example simplify the problem by utilizing the Market Value Added (MVA) which is equal to the rm's total maket value minus the capital invested. This shareholder value concept is directly derived from market capitalisation. At this point, we must consider the following problem: it is not certain that stock prices accurately reect the value of the rm. That's why we refer to the shareholder utility function without any specic reference to a value added measure or a shareholder wealth measure.
Actually, the shareholder utility function is the core of any capital allocation internal model.
An internal model for capital allocation must be based on a methodology. In portfolio management, we traditionally distinguish among two methods. The rst method, called top-down, consists in allocating capital to dierent asset classes, and then selecting the best securities within each asset class. In the second method, the bottom-up approach, we directly select the best securities. These two methods are now being used in bank capital allocation, but with some dierences (reference [2] ) because capital allocation systems in banks are based on the notion of Economic Capital: we could dene it as the amount of capital appropriate to cover worst-case losses in all but the most extreme economic scenarios.
The report [2] shows that the banks reviewed by the Task Force utilize internal economic capital allocations for two broad purposes: measuring risk-adjusted protability, and portfolio risk management. The bottom-up approach is relevant in the rst case whereas the top-down approach is adapted to portfolio management. A top-down internal allocation model can be viewed as a portfolio problem, the portfolio consisting of the bank's business lines.
The model uses two dierent categories of data. Internal data provide us with the expected returns and the risks of the bank's business lines. External data are employed to estimate the correlation matrix as dened in the methodology above. The expected returns and the risk measures could be completed by performance objectives announced by the dierent business lines. Let's notice that data collection is an important step and one has to be careful with the numbers provided by an historical analysis.
Moreover, the internal model has to take regulatory requirements into account. Another constraint concerns strategic issues, the general orientation of the bank's policy. Eventually, the solution given by the model is bound to depend on the current allocation. Indeed we do not deal with an allocation model but a reallocation one, which generates specic costs.
The gure (3) sums up the internal model process. 
where f is the objective function. In a SVA approach, this objective function is linked (directly or not) to the shareholder's wealth. I stands for the data the bank disposes of: the correlation matrix, its past performance, its objectives. Ω is a constraint eld which take into account regulatory and strategic requirements, and other technical constraints
As said in the previous section, reallocation generates costs we must evaluate and introduce into the model. This could be done by using a penalized objective function or/and by modelling some technical constraints. In the rst case, the objective function becomes f (α; I)−ζg (α, α 0 ): g represents a positive bounded function (g (α 0 , α 0 ) = 0) and α 0 is the current allocation vector. In the second case, technical constraints dene a maximal dierence between the actual allocation and the solution. Another technical constraint could be introduced in order to take sector competition into account.
We have done a graphical representation of the optimisation problem at the gure (4). This is just an illustration, but the scheme allows us to understand the dierence between a traditional asset allocation and a capital allocation problem.
Without any constraint, the solution is generally located on the ecient frontier. Introducing a penalized cost function moves the solution out of the the ecient frontier, to the inside of it. We notice another eect due to the objective function: the transformation is usually non linear in respect of the expected return and the risk of the portfolio.
If costs of reallocation are directly captured by the technical constraints, Ω may become a closed space. In main cases, regulatory requirements introduce a boundary on the right part of the space because they are aimed at limiting risk. We also represent strategic constraints even though, most of the time, strategic constraints cannot be represented by a geometric area on a mean-variance scheme. 
An illustration
In this paragraph, we present some examples illustrating the modelling of capital allocation. For convenience, α denotes the proportion of each business line in the portfolio. Then, we have
LetR denote the random vector of the business lines' returns. µ and σ are respectively the vector of the expected returns and the vector of risks. ρ is the correlation matrix of the business lines' returns. The expected return of a portfolio is given by α µ whereas the total risk corresponds to √ α Σα with
Let's point out a small dierence with the market factor model presented in the section 2 page 2. In the internal allocation model, σ m is the overall risk of the bank's business line m. There is no reason to add any specic risk and furthermore, we assume that σ m is a global measure that contains operating risks, etc.
Remark 4 All the computations are done with the values of expected returns and risks obtained previously.
Let's rst introduce a very simple example based on risk-adjusted performance measures (RAPM). Punjabi [1998] describes these measures as follows:
These measures take into account the risks embedded in the returns as well as the returns themselves and provide a common, aggregated framework to access the contributions of various transactions and business units to the rm's value.
There are dierent RAPM measures, but the most known (and the leading approach) is RAROC which is extensively documented in the litterature (James [1996] and Zaik, Walter, Kelling and James [1996] ). RAROC could be viewed as a performance measure dened as follows (Stoughton and Zechner [1999a] ):
We suppose that the cost of equity capital is zero so that we have
In the equation above, the Economic Capital EC is assimilated to a VaR measure. In a pure gaussian framework with a 99% condence level, k β is equal to Φ −1 (0.01) = 2, 33. If we do not impose any constraints, the optimisation of ς (α) consists in nding the tangent to the ecient frontier line which cuts the origin as explained in the gure (5). 
2 Because of the denition of α, C is equal to 1 for our example.
The consequence of cost of capital is represented at the gure (6) . By analogy to market equilibrium theory, the tangent is the Capital Market Line and the solution of the precedent problem corresponds to the Market Portfolio that has the highest Sharpe Ratio. However, we point out that this market portfolio may be constrained by regulatory requirements on risk. To illustrate this fact, we introduce the restriction c √ α Σα ≤ C, which could be interpreted as a VaR constraint. We clearly see that the market portfolio is likely to be unattainable.
Remark 5 The Market Portfolio dened in the previous paragraph is an internal portfolio computed from the past performance of the bank's business lines . 15%  15%  5%  25%  10%  10%  5%  American Business Lines  10%  5%  Total  15%  15%  5%  35%  10%  15%  0%  5% If we do not impose any constraint, the solution of the RAROC problem is the market portfolio. Unfortunately, the solution does not depend on the actual allocation. Such a solution is not realistic because it does not take reallocation costs or/and strategic issues into account.
Suppose that the bank managers prefer a smoothed reallocation. In a rst situation (case I), we impose that each business line share cannot move over 5%. The solution is represented at the gure (7) . In a second situtation (case II), we suppose that we consider a geographic reallocation: the amount of each business Even if the choice of the objective function is not obvious, the main diculty lies in dening the constraints in a mathematical point of view, in particular strategic ones. Yet this is a very important step which permits to know wether a reallocation policy is feasible or not. Indeed, we must take care that the problem has a solution. Suppose that we impose a target for the expected ROE in the third case 3 . If the target is too high, there is no solution to the problem. In this example, it is very easy to understand and to detect the inconsistency of the constraint. But when the problem becomes more complex, the inconsistency could be more easily detected when the mathemetic translation is done.
Implementing reallocation policy
The point of the previous section is to determine the optimum but it does not exhibit any path going from the initial allocation to the optimal one. The purpose of this section is to present a very simple method based on the lagrangian multipliers to give reallocation signals. We show that a dynamic policy based on these signals leads to the desired optimum. Implementing such a policy also allows constraints to evolve: the structure of constraints (in particular, strategic and technical constraints) depends on the implemented allocation so that changing the allocation transforms the contraints. The model we develop take this important issue into account. 3 This could be written as
Lagrangian multipliers as marginal prices
Let's consider the convex optimisation program
where C (α) represents the objective function and Ω the eld of admissible values. We note P α the program value, which means
To simplify the problem, we suppose that Ω is dened by I inequality constraints:
Remark 6 Equality constraints can be taken into account: a constraint h (α) = ζ is replaced by the inequality
We assume that the P problem has a solution (see Demange et Rochet [1992] for existence theorems and unicity ones). In this case, we can prove that there exists a vector λ ∈ R I satisfying
λ i coecients are called lagrangian coecients (or Kühn and Tucker multipliers). Let's point out that these coecients are always positive. From an economic point of view, they can be interpreted as the marginal prices of the dierent constraints. A parametrisation α (γ) (the optimum is associated to the vector γ representing the second member of the inequalities) sheds light on this last point. Indeed, we can prove that, for every vector ε in the vicinity of 0 M ,
Releasing the i th constraint by the acquisition of a marginal capacity unit ε i raises the objective function by λ i ε i .
Thus, we can establish wether a reallocation process is protable or not by comparing λ i to this unit's marginal cost of acquisition, and an optimal policy can be implemented so that a constraint is tightened if λ i = 0 or loosened in the other case.
An example
We consider a very simple example based on the previous RAROC problem. We use the allocation of six French banks. The gure (8) represent the expected return and the risk of these six allocation vectors. The table below report the dual prices (or the lagrandian coecients). We observe that even if two banks are closer in the mean-variance diagram, they may have dierent dual prices, because their allocation are dierent. Moreover, the dual prices indicates which allocation to reduce or to increase. 
Optimum implementation
The lagrangian multipliers play a very important role in the implementation of a program optimum which, in our case, can be interpreted as a dynamic reallocation exercise. Implementing an optimum amounts to nding a bounded or boundless series {α
and
{α t , t ∈ T } is a path that leads to the optimum. Thus, going from the current situationα to the optimal one α requires several steps, which seems quite relevant in the case of reallocation. Indeed, a reallocation policy has to be progressive in order to take into account the constraints linked to the current allocation.
Let P be the convex optimisation problem
Let P + be the reduced problem
with
This problem is equivalent to the starting problem with the additional constraint α =α. Let λ 
We reiterate this process until (26) is satised. Thus, we obtain a series {α t , t ∈ T } implementing the optimum.
Remark 7 There exist a large number of series {ε t , t ∈ T } based on the equation (24) 
Then, we can dene ε t such that We applied the technique above to implement the RAROC solution with ε t m + = 0.5%. The graphic (9) exhibits the evolution of the portfolio's path in the mean-variance diagram for four initial allocation vectors. Besides, we implemented the following sequential optimisation program in order to compare the results
The graphic (10) exhibits the results in the case of the L 1 norm with ϕ = 0.0035. Let's notice that the path we obtain using the dual prices is quite close to the one we get from the sequential program. Actually, the two paths coincide when variations are innitesimal (ϕ −→ 0 + and ε
Figure 9: Examples of optimum implementation
In the previous example, we suppose that the parameters and the structure of the constraints always remain the same from one iteration to another. Yet, we may consider that they are likely to evolve. For example, increasing the economic capital of one business line generates some market competition and, as a consequence, reduces the expected return. Therefore, it may be better to consider µ and σ as evolving parameters.
Moreover, moving the allocation may change the structure of the strategic or technical constraints. We could easily take this type of modication into account by modifying the problem at each step t
Ξ t is dened as a subset of α 0 , . . . , α t−1 :
• If Ξ t = ∅, then the solution of the program depends neither on the current allocation nor on the portfolio's path. • We could also take Ξ t = α 0 , . . . , α t−1 . In this case, the solution depends on the entire path.
Implementing an optimum with programs like (35) The gure (11) illustrates this approach:
0. Given a current allocation, we have computed the portfolio's path and the solution it leads to, without any constraints.
1. Then, we can suppose that because of market limitations, the expected returns depend on the dierence between the current allocation and the future one
with µ 0 the current observed expected return and µ < µ 0 if α > α 0 .
Figure 11:
Step-varying optimum implementation
We have considered a numerical example 4 whose path is reported at the gure (11) . In this case, the solution is very dierent from the Market Portfolio allocation (see the table above).
2. In the program (2), the uncertainty of returns is taken into account when the allocation moves 5 .
3. In a third problem, the objective function C t depends on Ξ t = α 0 , . . . , α t−1 . The underlying idea is that reallocation induces costs 6 .
We could do some remarks on these illustrative examples. First, we clearly see that the Market Portfolio is far from the current portfolio. For instance, the American BL #8 represents 33% of the Market Portfolio. When we consider reallocation costs, the proportion is reduced to only 9% (program 3). Since the current 4 The path (1) has been obtained with
If α 0 m is equal to zero, we have 5 The path (2) have been obtained with 6 The path (3) has been obtained with
where
portfolio does not include this business line, developping this activity implies very huge costs of entry. That's why its proportion becomes very small.
We must point out that we use the ML estimates of expected returns and risks. In an internal approach, it is clear that, for business lines that are not present in the bank, we have to use external data (for example, we could use data provided from benchmarks). These data should be adjusted to take into account the bank's specicity or the bank's strategy. In particular, if the activity m is not represented in the bank, maybe the bank had better leave this activity aside, which means that the bank will set µ m = 0.
Concluding remarks
This paper presents some ideas about bank capital allocation in a top-down approach. The problem is to nd out the way a manager must allocate the capital of a bank among dierent activities. A related issue lies in determining the activities he must enhance and the activities he must reduce, given a current allocation. Such an exercise requires an accurate denition and estimate of the data needed as inputs of the model, In particular we develop a market factor model to estimate the correlation matrix of the dierent business lines. The allocation problem can be treated as an asset allocation problem with specic constraints. Firstly, the bank's objective has to be clearly dened, which amounts to take into account the shareholder's wealth (for example, RAROC or EVA 7 ). Secondly the dierent constraints have to be modelled and nally, the path to reach the solution must be determined.
With allocation models in an Economic Capital framework, we abandon the concept of risk as a volatility measure. Nevertheless, there exist some links between the volatility and the economic capital in a gaussian analysis. In this case, the economic capital can be easily measured with an Earnings-at-Risk method and a k β rule. Yet, some problems may occur to reconciliate a top-down approach with a bottom-up one. In the case of our RAROC example, the economic capital of the business line m is α m or k m β σ m . Implicitely, we use dierent k β values to dene the solution. That's why we can be confronted with some problems during the capital consumption step (or with a bottom-up approach).
Research into bank capital allocation is heavily developped. At the time, it extensively deals with market risk or credit risk measures (see e.g. [1] , [3] , [9] , [18] and [20] ). Two problems are mostly investigated: the measurement problem (see e.g. [5] , [6] and [10] ) and the estimation method. Research has just begun to cope with two other problems: aggregation (see e.g. [13] and [34] ) and allocation programming (see e.g. [11] , [27] and [31] ). In our top-down approach, we don't face these problems because of the EaR oriented approach and the gaussian analysis we adopted. But it is possible to extend our study and relax these assumptions by using stochastic programming 8 .
